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Drones, Afghanistan and Beyond: Towards Analysis and Assessment in Context 
Introduction 
Very few scholarly studies into drone use focus specifically on Afghanistan.1 
‘[I]nternational forces [in Afghanistan] have shown a marked reluctance to discuss the use of 
drones’,2 and after 2003, media reporting shifted to Pakistan and Iraq,3 resulting in an 
‘informational black hole’ about drone use in Afghanistan.4 Afghanistan’s significance is 
considerable as contemporary US drone strike operations first occurred there in 2001, 5and drones’ 
roles and activities in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns in Afghanistan have 
shaped those in Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, and further afield. We argue 
analysing and assessing drone use in Afghanistan – our focus – or elsewhere is best done in 
appropriate context, including inter alia: policy goals; targeted ‘enemies’; and, local political, 
cultural, and social conditions. 
Fieldwork conducted in locations in eastern Nangarhar province, a strategically important 
area of Afghanistan, provides rich and informative accounts of drone use. Analysing these in 
context reveals details of its effects on local and other populations. This raises important concerns 
about the ability of the US to attain stated counterinsurgency and counterterrorism goals, and 
substantially adds to existing drone use study findings and debates. Our results show that 
contextualised analysis of drone use necessitates enquiry into local circumstances, issues of policy, 
and doctrine. In the Afghanistan case, US policy, doctrine, and consequent operations involve not 
 
1 Larry Lewis and Sarah Holewinski, ‘Changing of the Guard: Civilian Protection for an Evolving Military,’ 
PRISM 4:2 (2013) 57, 60; Larry Lewis ‘Drone Strikes: Civilian Casualty Considerations (Unclassified 
Executive Summary),’ Center for Naval Analyses, 18 June 2013. 
2 Alice K Ross, Jack Serle and Tom Wills, ‘Tracking Drone Strikes in Afghanistan: A Scoping Study,’ The 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 2014, 5. 
3 Christopher Drew, ‘Drones Are Playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan,’ New York Times, 19 February 
2010. 
4 Ann Rogers and John Hill, Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security (London: Pluto Press), 95. 
5 The first US drone strike occurred in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, Chris Woods, Sudden Justice – 
America’s Secret Drone Wars, (London: Hurst, 2015) 23-27, 38-39. Regarding drone emergence and 
Afghanistan’s significance: 4, 21-27, 40-45, 144-51, 243-51. 
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only serious incoherence, but also inaccurate assumptions about context, and insufficient 
appreciation of local circumstances and dynamics. This has far-reaching ramifications, for example, 
drone use in the fieldwork period was found to have seriously undermined governance institutions 
in the fieldwork locations, and beyond. These have a key historical and contemporary role in 
regulating communities in these locations (and others), their relations with the national authorities, 
and resistance to those encroaching or threatening them, such as terrorists and insurgents. 
Therefore, in this study we contribute to debates about how to analyse and assess drone use and its 
effects, demonstrating the usefulness of contextual approaches including methods drawn from 
anthropology, and we also contribute to findings and debates about drone use effects and their 
implications. Similar studies elsewhere in Afghanistan, and other locations subject to drone use, 
have much to offer. However, we indicate why drone analysis needs to change, and what more 
effective forms of research and analysis can reveal. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Part 1 argues existing studies overlook important contextual 
factors resulting in effectiveness claims that are too narrowly drawn and misleading assessments. 
Prominent quantitative studies conflate important categories, make inapt assumptions about 
comparability across locations, and lack perspective on key concepts. Effective criticisms exist of 
more qualitative studies looking at local populations’ drone experiences, but these are not inherent 
to qualitative studies.6 Furthermore, we show incoherence in counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency doctrine, particularly envisaged policy goals and underpinning 
conceptualisations. 
Part 2 describes our fieldwork methodology and its context. Boyle’s ‘potentially offsetting 
effects’ are developed as an appropriate framework for contextually analysing drone use. As we 
 
6 A key target for such critique is James Cavallaro, et al. Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to 
Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan. New York, NY, International Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution Clinic, Stanford Law School; NYU School of Law, Global Justice Clinic (2012). See: Aqil Shah 
‘Do U.S. Drone Strikes Cause Blowback? Evidence from Pakistan and Beyond,’ International Security 42:4 
(2018), 52; C. Christine Fair, ‘Ethical and Methodological Issues in Assessing Drones’ Civilian Impacts in 
Pakistan,’ Washington Post, 6 October 2014.  
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show, although this required amendment for specific context, Boyle’s categories of ‘popular 
backlash’, ‘counter-mobilisation of enemy networks’, ‘legitimacy gap’, and ‘leverage’ enable 
appropriately contextualised analysis.7 This framework could be used in different contexts, 
including outside Afghanistan, if tailored with appropriate care.  
Part 3 explores fieldwork results showing how these populations experience and understand 
drones and their uses through, firstly, quotidian cultural, social and economic practices; and, 
secondly, local (in-)security, and their perception of the role of different actors. Results show a 
consistent and specific pattern of drone-impacted governance eroding the population’s deep-rooted 
resistance to terrorist/insurgent activities, militating against achieving counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency goals in these locations and elsewhere.  
Our study addresses important research gaps in analysing and assessing drone effectiveness 
by taking into account wider effects and implications of drone use including in the under-researched 
case of Afghanistan. It does so by carefully considering policy goals, concurrent counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency, and appropriate context, including cultural and societal factors. It does not 
seek to definitively determine whether drone use is effective or not, given, as we show, the 
importance of context and circumstance in reaching such judgements. 
 
1. Drones and context 
1.1 Academic analysis 
Drone use in counterterrorism and/or counterinsurgency has become closely associated with 
targeted killing and/or leadership decapitation,8 against terrorist and/or insurgent groups. Numerous 
 
7 Michael J. Boyle ‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ International Affairs 
86:2 (2010), 333-353. 
8 Targeted killing can refer to any individual, unless qualified. Reference to decapitation in such studies is 
usually to the (targeted) killing of leadership figures and/or their arrest/capture, e.g.: Aaron Mannes, ‘Testing 
the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity?’ 
Journal of International Policy Solutions, 9 (2008), 40–9; Jenna Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll: Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,’ Security Studies 18:4 (2009), 719-55; Patrick B. Johnston, ‘Does 
Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns,’ 
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empirical studies analyse and assess effectiveness, including some qualitative case-based studies 
across a range of contexts.9 There is not a consensus about the effectiveness of targeted 
killing/decapitation or the use of drones. David’s and Byman’s qualitative studies focus on the 
Israel-Palestine context, finding targeted killing/decapitation can be effective in conjunction with 
other measures.10 Among such studies, only Wilner focuses on Afghanistan,11 however, only one of 
his four cases of targeted killing may have involved a drone (Mullah Mahmud Baluch). His results 
showed short-term changes to Taliban effectiveness, professionalism and motivation.   
Other studies use aggregated statistical data across a range of contexts, for example Mannes, 
Jordan, Price, Abrahms and Potter (in counterterrorism), Johnston (in counterinsurgency), Abrahms 
and Mierau (against militants).12 None focus specifically on drones. Other studies focus on more 
particular contexts and on drones, such as Jaeger and Siddique, and Abrahms and Mierau on 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Johnston and Sarbahi, Mir and Moore, and Rigterink on Pakistan.13  
 
International Security 36:4 (2012), 47–79; Bryan C. Price, ‘Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership 
Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism,’ International Security 36:4 (2012), 9-46. Exceptions, 
referring to decapitation as only killing, include: Max Abrahms and Philip Potter, ‘Explaining Terrorism - 
Leadership Deficits And Militant Group Tactics,’ International Organization 69:2 (2015), 311–42; Max 
Abrahms and Jochen Mierau, ‘Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group 
Tactics.’ Terrorism and Political Violence 29:5 (2017), 830-51. 
9 Matt Frankel, ‘The ABCs of HVT: Key Lessons from High Value Targeting Campaigns Against Insurgents 
and Terrorists,’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34:1 (2010) 17-30. Keith Patrick Dear, ‘Beheading the 
Hydra? Does Killing Terrorist or Insurgent Leaders Work?’ Defence Studies 13:3 (2013) 293-337; Daniel 
Byman, ‘Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,’ Foreign Affairs 92:4 (2013), 
32–43; Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘Why Drones Fail - When Tactics Drive Strategy,’ Foreign Affairs 92:4 
(2013), 44-54. 
10 Steven R. David, ‘Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,’ Ethics and International Affairs 17:1 (2003), 111–
26; Daniel Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’ Foreign Affairs 85:2 (2006), 95–111. 
11 Alex S. Wilner, ‘Targeted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in 
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33:4 (2010), 307-329. 
12 Mannes, ‘Testing the Snake Head Strategy’; Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll’; Jordan Jenna, 'Attacking the 
Leader Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes', International Security 38:4 
(2014), 7–38; Price ‘Targeting Top Terrorists’; Johnston, ‘Does Decapitation Work?; Abrahms and Potter, 
‘Explaining Terrorism’; Abrahms and Mierau, ‘Leadership Matters’.  
13 Patrick B. Johnston and Anook K. Sarbahi, ‘The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in 
Pakistan,’International Studies Quarterly 60:2 (2016), 203-19; David A. Jaeger and Zahra Siddique, ‘Are 
Drone Strikes Effective in Afghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence between the United 
States and the Taliban,’ (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, December 2011); Asfandyar Mir 
and Dylan Moore, ‘Drones, Surveillance, and Violence: Theory and Evidence from a US Drone Program,’ 
International Studies Quarterly 63:4 (2019) 846–862; Anouk S. Rigterink ‘The Wane of Command: 
Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations,’ American Political Science Review 
115:1 (2020), 31-50. 
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Despite sharing quantitative approaches, these studies of targeted killing/decapitation employ 
different definitions, data, methodologies, and measures of effectiveness, from the rate of terrorist 
or insurgent attacks to groups’ lifespans and even propaganda output,14 making comparisons 
between them difficult. Aggregate studies (from different contexts) suggest or claim targeted 
killing/decapitation speeds up the decline of insurgent or terrorist organisations or diminishes the 
number or intensity of their attacks,15 whilst others suggest it makes little, if any, difference or may 
be counterproductive.16 As with aggregate quantitative studies of the effectiveness of targeted 
killings across numerous contexts those focussed on Pakistan and Afghanistan,17 and on Pakistan, 
also see no consensus.18  
A recurrent difficulty is studies of targeted killing/decapitation addressing Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, including specifically through drone strikes, rarely differentiate between them. Jaeger and 
Siddique, for example, considered drone strikes mainly in Pakistan, but assess their effect on 
violence in Afghanistan (but not drone strikes in Afghanistan). Similarly, Johnston and Sarbahi 
analysed drone strikes in the FATA (Federally Administrated Tribal Areas) region of Pakistan, not 
Afghanistan, but analysed the effect of these strikes on militant violence in FATA, in other parts of 
Pakistan, and neighbouring areas of Afghanistan. Abrahms and Potter also considered targeted 
killing of militant groups’ leadership in ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal regions’, but do not distinguish 
between them. More seriously, Abrahms and Mierau treat ‘Taliban’ as a single organisation (which 
they are not), thereby conflating Afghan and Pakistan Taliban, and also aggregate strikes in 
 
14 Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh, ‘Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al Qaeda? Evidence from Propaganda 
Output,’ Terrorism and Political Violence 25:2 (2013), 311–27.   
15 E.g. Abrahms and Mierau, ‘Leadership matters’; Johnston, ‘Does Decapitation Work?; Price, 'Targeting 
Top Terrorists’.  
16 Studies finding them ineffective and/or counter-productive include: Aaron Mannes, ‘Testing the Snake 
Head Strategy’; Jordan, ‘When Heads Roll’; Jordan, 'Attacking the Leader Missing the Mark’.  
17 Abrahms and Siddique found little significant impact of these drone strikes on Taliban attacks in 
Afghanistan, but some significant reduction in Pakistan Taliban violence resulting from drone strikes in 
Pakistan. However, Abrahms and Mierau, found killing Taliban leadership in both Pakistan and Afghanistan 
had a ‘modest’ effect and ‘promote[d] indiscriminate organizational violence’. 
18 Johnson and Sarbahi find drone strikes reduce violence in FATA, other parts of Pakistan and bordering 
areas of Afghanistan, and Mir and Moore find US drone use in Pakistan reduced violence in targeted areas. 
However, Rigterink found killing a terrorist leader by a drone increased violence levels significantly. 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although similar rather narrowly construed accounts of ‘effectiveness’ 
are employed in these studies, such as levels of violence, there are important variations in data 
sources, treatment, and analysis using a variety of statistical techniques. However, important 
differences between terrorist and insurgent groups involved are neglected, such as contextualising 
their different forms, modes of action, and goals. Nor are differences between counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency considered. Rigterink, in her study of drone strikes in Pakistan and some in 
Afghanistan, differentiates between different groupings using ‘Taliban’ in their titles, but treats 
them all as ‘terrorist’ groups, ignoring their role in insurgencies. Considerable analytical cost arises, 
as important differences between groups, their political agendas, activities, and interactions are set 
aside. Furthermore, none of these studies show interest in effects of targeted killing on local 
populations much beyond the extent to which they may be victims of increased terrorist violence.  
Shah’s evaluation of a ‘drone blowback thesis’ is an exception to such narrow focus on 
effects of targeted killing/decapitation, including by drones in Pakistan. This thesis postulates drone 
use effects, ‘such as civilian casualties, military operations, mental distress, [and] displacement’, 
lead to increased ‘militant recruitment, and militancy’.19 Shah’s qualitative, primarily interview-
based, study refutes the thesis.  However, broader enquiry into effects of drone use upon the area or 
populations was not undertaken. It also does not specifically study Afghanistan.  
Thus, wider effects of drone use/strikes, beyond narrow measures of group violence levels, 
intensity and/or group decline, remain at issue. Several studies stress this, whether emphasising 
targeted killing/decapitation,20 or particularly referencing drones. 21 They also acknowledge the 
need for wider assessment in context extends to policy goals beyond narrow, if statistically 
 
19 Aqil Shah, ‘Do U.S. Drone Strikes Cause Blowback? Evidence from Pakistan and Beyond,’ International 
Security 42:4 (2018), 47-84, 55. 
20 Frankel, 'The ABCs of HVT’, 17-30, 26; Stephanie Carvin, ‘The Trouble with Targeted Killing,’ Security 
Studies 21:3 (2012): 529-555. 
21 Javier Jordán, ‘The Effectiveness of the Drone Campaign against Al Qaeda Central: A Case Study.’ 
Journal of Strategic Studies 37:1 (2014), 4-29; Jacqueline L.
 
Hazelton, ‘Drone Strikes and Grand Strategy: 
Toward a Political Understanding of the Uses of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks in US Security Policy,’ 
Journal of Strategic Studies 40:1-2 (2017), 68-91, 86. 
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assessable, metrics of effectiveness in quantitative studies. Frankel, Dear, and Boyle also raise 
important differences between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, neglected in quantitative 
studies.22 
Frankel emphasises the counterinsurgency/counterterrorism distinction noting the ‘ability to 
predict second-order effects of the removal of key figures’ is ‘one of the most important, and 
overlooked drivers of success of an HVT [High Value Targeting] campaign’, including 
‘understanding of the larger dynamics’ that go beyond ‘degradation of the group’.23  ‘[F]inding the 
right balance between broader counterinsurgency efforts and HVT activities is vital.’ And, ‘[t]his is 
where an overreliance on drone strikes can be problematic.’ HVT, typifying counterterrorism 
operations, ‘tend to be independent’ of counterinsurgency efforts.24 Dear’s study of targeted killing 
(including drone use), pays considerable attention to Afghanistan in finding ‘targeted 
killing…largely ineffective, and worse, is often actively counterproductive tactic in COIN … [as] 
humans respond to fear by innovating, seeking revenge and uniting.’25 Boyle distinctively 
highlights the importance of carefully considering the implications of concurrent counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism efforts with specific reference to Afghanistan circa. 2009-2010.  
Dear and Fuller underscore the importance of context and both refer to factors pertinent to 
Afghanistan. Dear cites the significance of kinship ties and specifically Pasthun culture in parts of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.26  Fuller observes ‘the tribal regions which make up the FATA, the 
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and the border provinces of Afghanistan are all distinct 
regions, each with its own unique identity, tribes, culture, social groupings, and history.’27 Shah’s 
refutation of the ‘blowback’ hypothesis regarding drone strikes/targeted killing challenges some of 
 
22 Frankel, 'The ABCs of HVT’; Dear, ‘Beheading the Hydra?; Boyle, ‘Do Counterterrorism and 
Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ 
23 Frankel, 'The ABCs of HVT’, 26. 
24 Ibid., 20. 
25 Dear, ‘Beheading the Hydra?’ 325. 
26 Dear, ‘Beheading the Hydra?’ 309-311. 
27 Christopher J. Fuller, See It/Shoot It: The Secret History of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2017), x. 
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the claims about tribal and cultural practices amongst Pashtun groups. In particular, his interview-
based research suggests claims of drone strikes precipitating ‘blood feuds’ that see victims’ 
relatives joining terrorist or insurgent groups reflect inaccurate colonial-era anthropological 
simplifications and misrepresentations.28 However, non-colonial era studies, such as by Ahmed, 
support this.29 Also, Shah offers little by way of research-based correctives through contemporary 
anthropological and cultural insights into these varied groups.  
 
1.2 Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism 
Frankel points out profound differences between the end goals of counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism: bringing ‘the movement into the political process’ and the ‘elimination’ of a 
terrorist organisation, respectively.30 US doctrine applicable during the fieldwork period confirms 
this. In counterinsurgency doctrine, ‘the host nation must eventually provide a solution that is 
culturally acceptable to its society and meets US policy goals31 … Ultimate success comes when a 
society maintains its own legitimate government and defeats its insurgency using its own resources, 
not through outside enablers.’32 Therefore, it is unlikely to be as clear as in a conventional 
conflict.33 In counterterrorism doctrine, the expectation is ‘there will never be a complete 
eradication of terrorism … the ends of counterterrorism operations are the elimination of a 
terrorist’s ability or willingness to conduct terrorist acts against the homeland/US facilities and 
interests abroad or facilitate other terrorist organisations to act against the United States.’34 A 
paradox emerges: counterterrorism doctrine asserts the elimination of either the ability or 
 
28 Shah, ‘Do U.S. Strikes Cause Blowback?’ 62-64. 
29 Akhbar S. Ahmed, Pakhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a 
Tribal Society (London: Routledge, 1980). 
30 Frankel, ‘The ABCs of HVT’, 26. 
31 U.S. Department of the Army, ‘The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (U.S. 
Army Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5)’ (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2014), (hereafter FM3-24 2014) para. 1-6. 
32 Ibid. para. 7-39. 
33 Ibid. para. 1-25. 
34 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism (Joint Publication 3-26) (Washington, DC: 24 October 2014), 
(hereafter, JP3-26 2014), I-5, V-1. 
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willingness of terrorists to conduct attacks against the US and its interests (including abroad), 
although how much of an interest this is to Afghanistan (or others) is unaddressed. Furthermore, 
reconciling a ‘solution that is culturally acceptable’ to Afghanistan ‘and its society’ with one that 
‘meets US policy goals’ that have been (re-)prioritised to counterterrorism and the direct defence of 
America post-circa 2009-1035 leaves limited common ground between the US and Afghanistan 
against terrorism and even less so against insurgency.  
Boyle’s analysis of conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency concurrently in 
Afghanistan up to circa. 2010 questions their compatibility.36 ‘[T]he record of the war in 
Afghanistan suggests … both models of warfare involve tradeoffs or costs that may offset the gains 
made by the other’ and that they ‘may operate at cross-purposes and make long-term strategic 
success more elusive.’37 US doctrine provides additional support to his concerns as 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism substantially differ in operational modalities. In 
counterterrorism the more ‘kinetic’ ‘Defeat Mechanism’ and the ‘Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, 
Analyze and Disseminate (F3EAD) process [is used] to plan for and execute all counterterrorism 
operations against terrorists and terrorist organizations and networks’ in pursuit of cumulative 
effects.38 However, in counterinsurgency, effects occur in combination with reference to the 
‘Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework’. Counterterrorism effects are much more focused 
on the use of force in comparison to counterinsurgency.39 In counterinsurgency the population is the 
centre of gravity, rather than hostile forces, as in counterterrorism, which provides a key 
distinction.40 Moreover, although counterterrorism doctrine asserts effects are to be ‘balanced’ 
 
35 Hew Strachan, The Direction of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 259; Gareth Porter, 
‘How McChrystal and Petraeus built an indiscriminate “killing machine”’, Truthout, 26 September 2011. 
36 Boyle, ‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ 336. 
37 Ibid. 
38 JP3-26 2014,V-3. 
39 E.g.: JP3-26 2014, IV-11, compared with FM3-24 2014. 
40 David H. Ucko, ‘Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan – A concept in Crisis,’ PRISM 3:1 (2013), 13. 
Usefully characterized as the interface of war’s logic and grammar: Antulio J. Echevarria II, ‘Reconsidering 
War's Logic and Grammar’ Infinity Journal 1:2 (2011), and a matter of judgment in the application of 
doctrine to specific situations as part of strategy. Thomas R. Mockaitis, ‘The COIN Conundrum: the Future 
of Counterinsurgency and US Land Power,’ (Carlisle, Penn.: US Army War College Press, 2016), 6-7. 
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(including with counterinsurgency efforts), it is ambiguous as to what this, and what the two 
additional tenets of ‘collaboration’ and ‘precision’, mean.41 In 2014 and 2015, Afghan National 
Security and Defence Forces (ANDSF) continued to pursue counterinsurgency with support and 
guidance from the US and NATO-led troops, although the US focussed mostly on 
counterterrorism.42 However, coordination was often difficult and lacking.43   
Boyle similarly notes how counterinsurgency and counterterrorism involve different 
assumptions about the role of force, the importance of winning support among the local population, 
and the necessity of building a strong and representative government.44 His elaboration through 
three main areas demonstrates how analysing and assessing drone use necessitates appropriate 
contextualisation including different policy goals, and the specific circumstances pertaining to 
Afghanistan.  
Firstly regarding force, Boyle emphasises its discriminate and slow use in counterinsurgency 
because of the need to shape the preferences of the population. However, counterterrorism 
emphasises its swift use to eliminate terrorists.45 While counterinsurgency aims to draw the 
population toward the government using direct and indirect means to undercut support for the 
insurgency, counterterrorism does not. In pursuit of this aim counterinsurgency seeks to build the 
capacity of local government through the provision of security, governance, and development, but 
counterterrorism does not.46 
Secondly, regarding winning the support of the local population, Boyle asserts 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism involve different assumptions about the relationship 
 
41 JP3-26 2014, II-1, II-2.  
42 E.g. Azam Ahmed and Joseph Goldstein, ‘Taliban Gains Pull U.S. Units Back Into Fight in Afghanistan’, 
New York Times, 29 April 2015; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Quarterly 
Report to the United States Congress,’ 30 July 2015, 96, 105, 182. 
43 Discussions with Afghan government and military officers, diplomats and international military officers.  
44 Notably broadly aligning with: Ucko, ‘Counterinsurgency After Afghanistan,’ 13; David Kilcullen, ‘Three 
Pillars of Counterinsurgency,’ Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, 
Washington D.C., 28 September, 2006.  
45 Confirmed by Michael, V. Hayden, ‘To Keep America Safe, Embrace Drone Warfare,’ New York Times, 
19 February 2016. 
46 Boyle, ‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ 343. 
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between the local population and enemies. Boyle observes there is little evidence Al Qaeda has 
wide support among the population in Afghanistan. Therefore, the use of force in counterinsurgency 
should weaken the insurgency without alienating the population or causing a significant backlash. 
Overall, Boyle cites the need for a political approach to address poor governance, poverty and 
corruption, in addition to military challenges.47  
Thirdly, regarding strong and representative government, a strict counterterrorism approach 
to military force does not involve a state-building component or an assumption of the need for 
‘territorial control’. Counterterrorism is premised on ‘a lack of self-policing by the state’, 
principally in areas of limited state capacity to maintain order such as ‘ungoverned spaces’. 
Counterinsurgency, however, ‘requires boosting the capacity of a government to exercise control 
over its own territory by countering the growth of the shadow government.’48 While this third point 
is broadly supported by applicable counterinsurgency and counterterrorism doctrine and US policy 
towards Afghanistan, it also reveals problematic assumptions and conceptualisations regarding 
context with important implications for assessing drone use (and other) effects. The influential 
conceptuality of ‘failed states’ and the interrelated conceptualities of [terrorist] ‘safe havens’ and 
‘ungoverned areas’ exemplify analytical dangers of insufficiently contextualised assumptions.  
Although no universal definition of ‘failed or failing states’ exists,49 US policy, and 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism doctrine have explicitly employed these since 2002 to the 
fieldwork period.50 This is reflective of ‘the problem [that counterterrorism] [had become] 
‘securitised’, particularly by the US, and so was linked to economic backwardness, governmental 
 
47 Ibid. 344. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Liana S. Wyler, ‘Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy,’ Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, RL34253, Updated 28 August 2008, 4. 
50 Susan E. Rice, ‘The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States,’ Report, Brookings, 19 
February 2003; The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ May 
2010, 8,11, 21; The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’ 
February 2015, 4, 9; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism (Joint Publication 3-26) (Washington, DC: 
13 November 2009), (hereafter JP3-26 2009), III-8; FM3-24 2014, 2-7. 
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weakness and religious fundamentalism’.51 As Lamb has commented regarding ‘ungoverned areas’: 
‘few places in the world are truly ‘ungoverned’’.52 Nonetheless, the term ‘ungoverned’ had 
purchase, despite its elasticity. What constitutes ‘effective governance’ and ‘good governance’ in 
the context of Afghanistan is of far-reaching significance, as customary governance remains 
influential in political, security, and development efforts. Even though areas of Afghanistan, 
including those that border Pakistan (as do fieldwork areas) are ‘one of the most unstable and 
strategically important places in the world’53 a more complex reality frequently exists than these 
interlinked conceptualisations tend to admit. Such areas can be (as in the case of the fieldwork 
locations) largely self-governing and autonomous. They can also have historical loyalties to the 
Afghan state and central government, rather than be ‘ungoverned’ and ‘[terrorist] safe havens’.  
This adds to the need to carefully consider policy and interrelated counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency efforts, including drone use, in context to more clearly understand their effects. 
This section has summarised a two-fold lack of contextualisation in analyses and 
assessments of drone use and its effects. Academic studies, particularly those employing statistical 
techniques, tend to limit context in pursuit of ostensibly objective statistically significant measures 
of the effectiveness (or otherwise) of targeted killing/decapitation, including drone strikes. This sees 
simplified, even incorrect, group designations, and definitions placed ahead of important contextual 
factors. Inconsistent geographical reference points neglect distinctions between conflict areas, and 
different data sources occlude key factors. Consequently, political, geographical, and cultural 
contexts are set aside or minimised resulting in problematic comparisons, or worse, and 
consequently limited conclusions. Secondly, in contexts where counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency are both undertaken, such as Afghanistan, these efforts can be at odds with one 
another and involve different assumptions, emphases, techniques and policy goals, including under 
 
51 Strachan, Direction of War, 268. 
52 Robert D. Lamb, ‘Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens,’ Washington, DC,, Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2008), 4, 6. 
53 Gilles Dorronsorro, ‘The Transformation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border,’ in Under The Drones 
Modern Lives in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Borderlands ed. Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews 
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), 30.  
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US doctrine.  This is further guided and amplified by the problematic conceptualities of ‘failed and 
failing states’, ‘ungoverned areas’, and ‘[terrorist] safe-havens’. These misconstrue context and 
overlook the importance of local governance and related cultural institutions, social practices, and 
political dynamics, which historically enable populations to regulate their communities, and 
cooperatively oppose insurgents and terrorists. Thus, the need to appropriately contextualise drone 
use and its effects in order to understand and assess these becomes particularly apparent.   
 
2. Towards contextualisation 
2.1 Fieldwork methods.  
Fieldwork occurred between mid-September and late October 2015, involving 37 in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with Afghan men aged between (approximately) 20 and 75.54 Random 
sampling was not possible under the circumstances. To reduce selection bias we indicated 
categories for respondents relevant to the localities to reflect a broad range of possible views among 
the local population. 22 interviewees were subsistence farmers, 11 were Maliks (local tribally-
related village/community chiefs), and four were from other groups. It was not viable to interview 
women given cultural and security sensitivities. Fieldwork was conducted by a leading Kabul-based 
research organisation with highly trained and experienced Afghan field researchers. It has done 
fieldwork for leading European and North American universities, NGOs, and foreign and 
development ministries. Interviews mainly occurred in two areas of eastern Nangarhar province: 15 
in the east of Lal Pur district and 22 in southern Nazian district. Fieldwork locations were selected 
based on publicly available drone use data including: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
(TBIJ) database; US military/NATO official statements; press releases from the Provincial 
Governor’s office; and, contemporary press reports. These locations experienced intensive drone 
use in the period preceding the fieldwork and occupy strategic border locations often referred to as 
 
54 2 aged 18-25; 4 26-35; 10 36-45; 12 46-55; 5 55-65; 3 65+; 1 unknown. 
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‘safe haven’ areas. Continuing review established drone use intensity persisted or subsequently 
increased. 
Interviews were informed by three pre-existing assertions regarding drone use in general and 
relevant to the context of Afghanistan: (i) done properly, targeted killings can strengthen support for 
the host government, which is key to defeating an insurgency;55 (ii) drones may reduce tensions 
between peacebuilding activities and waging war;56  and, (iii) drone strikes (and use) do more good 
than harm.57 Posing these claims directly could be leading and delimiting in the context of 
Afghanistan. Therefore, research questions, developed in consultation with experienced Afghan 
researchers, aimed to enable indirect assessment of these assertions and generate in-depth insight.  
Consequently, testable hypotheses were not an explicit element of our data gathering strategy.  
Interviewees were asked about: (1) personal experience(s) of drone use, and views about 
drone use in Afghanistan and Pakistan; (2) understanding of the relationship between drones and the 
US and NATO; (3) views of the effects of drone use. More detailed sub-questions were agreed to 
ensure comparability whilst recognizing respondents’ experiences and willingness to discuss topics 
could vary. Consequently, sequencing of questions was at fieldworkers’ discretion.  No direct 
questions about counterinsurgency or counterterrorism were asked, as it was considered these 
concepts might not be sufficiently clearly understood by interviewees. Full details of the questions 
are in the on-line annex.  
Fieldwork researchers proceeded to the fieldwork locations after in-depth briefings 
including the director, senior members of the research organisation and at least one co-author. 
These addressed the importance of unbiased selection, research aims, ethics, and consultation and 
clarification of the questions (including translation). Review and research ethics approvals took 
 
55 Frankel, ‘The ABCs of HVT, 18. 
56 Astri Suhrke, ‘Waging War and Building Peace in Afghanistan,’ International Peacekeeping 19:4 (2012), 
489. 
57 Avery Plaw, ‘Drones Save Lives, American and Other,’ New York Times, 14 November 2012. 
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place within Durham University’s procedures. Fieldworkers had substantial prior knowledge of the 
fieldwork locations.  
Respondents were interviewed separately in private for precision and safety. Occasionally, 
respondents were interviewed outside the fieldwork area by mutual agreement. Typically, each 
interview lasted 30-45 minutes, with more than one interview as appropriate. Aiming to move 
beyond conditioned and group expectation induced responses,58 ‘an interviewing style built on 
rapport and empathetic understanding’ was employed.59 This methodologically reflexive attitude is 
well suited to the sensitive nature of such discussions.60 
An ‘ethnographic’ methodological approach was employed to understand individuals’ 
perspectives and thoughts, responses, and actions via their own experiences,61 and from within their 
culture as they attempted to interpret situations in order to act.62 Factors were considered in context, 
utilizing ‘…a combination of empirical investigation and subsequent subjective understanding of 
human phenomena’.63  
Complementing this, Grounded Theory methodology was employed to enable exploration of 
integral social relationships and the behaviour of groups, including where there has been little 
exploration of the contextual factors affecting individual’s lives.64 This also enabled exploration of 
 
58 Paul Highgate and Ailsa Cameron, ‘Reflexivity in Researching the Military,’ Armed Forces and Society, 
32:2 (2006), 219-33. 
59 Elaine Campbell, ‘Interviewing Men in Uniform: a Feminist Approach?’ International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology 6:4 (2003), 285-304, 289. 
60 Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Research in Conflict Zones: Ethics and Accountability,’ Forced Migration Review 
no. 8 (2000), 12-15. 
61 Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the Social Organization of Cultural Difference 
(Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), 33-54.  
62 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 345-59; Alan Tongs, ‘The Philosophical Basis of Geertz's Social 
Anthropology,’ Eastern Anthropologist 46:1 (1993), 1-17. 
63 Mark R. Woodward, ‘Hermeneutics,’ in Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology, ed. David Levinson and 
Melvin Ember (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 555-558, 555. 
64 Dauna L. Crooks, ‘The Importance of Symbolic Interaction in Grounded Theory Research on Women’s 
Health,’ Health Care for Women International 22:1-2 (2001): 11-27.  
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further approaches, for example, ethnography, cultural and political anthropology, and potentially 
social network analysis, as identified by Charmaz.65  
Throughout preparations, the fieldwork, and during follow up, personal and research biases 
are unavoidable. Therefore, there has been consistent and extensive reflection and discussion with 
members of the research team, self-reflexive analysis, and comparison with the widest array of 
human and documentary sources possible. Discussions with a range of long-established independent 
contacts knowledgeable about and in direct contact with the fieldwork areas has confidentially 
crosschecked details and results.66  
Interviews were transcribed in Pashtu and translated by the research organisation into 
English. We hand-coded results against question areas for consistent comparative analysis. In 
presenting results, we have randomly assigned numbers between 1 and 100 and minimised possible 
identifying characteristics to ensure interviewees’ anonymity.  Each transcript is limited to no more 
than three citations; ensuring identification is not possible through crosschecking. Where interviews 
are quoted, we report the fieldwork organisation’s translations, correcting only clear spelling or 
punctuation errors, or standardising spelling. Where we believe there is clear reason to adjust 
transcripts, this is indicated by square parentheses. 
 
2.2 The fieldwork locations in eastern Nangarhar 
Understanding context of the interview sites involves multiple dimensions, including the 
inhabitants, their customs, practices, culture, organisation, and historical experiences. This enables 
interview results to reveal appropriate drone effects, and analysis and assessment of their 
 
65 Kathy Charmaz, ‘Grounded Theory,’ in Rethinking Methods in Psychology, ed. J. Smith, et al. (London: 
Sage, 1995), 27-49; Kathy Charmaz, ‘Grounded theory analysis,’ in Handbook of Interview Research ed. J. 
F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), 675–94. 
66 Validity procedures were carried out following Table 1 of John W. Cresswell and Dana L. Miller, 
‘Determining Validity in Qualitative Inquiry,’ Theory Into Practice 39:2 (2000): 124-130, 126. 
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significance. Despite their relative geographical proximity, the two fieldwork locations significantly 
differ in context, indicating commonalities in drone effects are likely more generalisable.  
Inhabitants interviewed in Lal Pur were from either the Murad khel sub-tribe of the 
Mohmand (11) or the Miyagan (4), which is spiritually related to the Mohmand.  All Nazian 
interviewees were from the Sangu Khel sub-tribe of the Shinwari. Interviewees strongly self-
identified with their respective tribes and sub-tribes, and customary behaviours.67 This is 
unsurprising as the Mohmand and Shinwari tribes are amongst the most united in Afghanistan.68  
Both tribes have, at different junctures, supported the central government politically, 
providing renowned soldiers and leaders to attack an external enemy, or protect it against internal 
uprising.69 They have also both rebelled against the central government with serious results,70 and 
adopted a neutral position in the face of others’ rebellions.71 Mohmand and Shinwari men have 
served in the central government due to their estrangement from fundamentalists,72 and other 
engagements reflect political hedging strategies.73  
 
67 Barth’s insights were applied in assessing the diacritical features and basic value orientations of the 
cultural contents of ethnic dichotomies, Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 13-14. Consideration of the 
Mohmand tribe (also present over the border in Pakistan) employed Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society. 
See also Shahmahmood Miakhel, ‘The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: 
Their Role in Security and Governance,’ in Challenges and Dilemmas of State-Building in Afghanistan: 
Report of a Study Trip to Kabul, ed. Arpita Basu Roy (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2008); Bernt Glatzer, ‘Is 
Afghanistan On The Brink Of Ethnic and Tribal Disintegration?’ in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan 
and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (London: Hurst, 1998), 167-81. 
68 David Mansfield, ‘All Bets are Off! Prospects for (B)reaching Agreements and Drug Control in Helmand 
and Nangarhar in the run up to Transition’ AREU (January 2013), 5-45, 28-31; Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, 
Kalashnikov and Laptop: the neo-Taleban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007), 62. Also, 
enquires with field researchers, inhabitants of the eastern region, academics (including Afghan), and Afghan 
and international civilian and military government officials.  
69 Peter Thomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts and the Failures of Great 
Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 70-73. 
70 Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1973). 
71 William R. H. Merk, The Mohmands, Reprint,(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1984). 
72 Antonio Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992,(London: Hurst and Georgetown 
University Press, 2000), 132. 
73 Regarding contemporary political dynamics in Nangarhar province involving Shinwari and Mohmands, 
with implications for Afghanistan’s national politics, see David Mansfield, ‘The Devil is in the Details: 




The Mohmand tribe, and its ‘distinct hereditary leaders’, has historically had ‘intimate 
relations with the Kabul government’,74 reflecting its geo-strategic location. Central government 
granted the tribe special concessions, for example exemption from conscription in the 1980s, 
reflecting their status and culture. The current leader of the Mohmand tribe has worked with 
numerous Kabul governments, including the (Communist) People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA), and has had generally good relations with the post-2001Afghan government 
including at the most senior levels.75 An ‘enduring and almost symbiotic relationship between the 
Afghan state and the Mohmandi tribal elite’ exists.76  
The Mohmand and Shinwari tribe have historically been fierce rivals, partly as a result of 
their geographical and other proximities, and significant differences between the two tribes (and 
their sub-tribes) exist. Yet, as will be seen, fieldwork results show very little variation despite this.  
In Nangarhar, parts of adjacent provinces, and Pakistan the Shinwari have a long and proud 
history of resisting ‘interference’ in their independence from central and other authorities. 
According to Ahmed’s typology, they are Nang (honour) Pashtuns: tribes with an egalitarian society 
possessing three critical features: a low material standard of living, an absence of political authority, 
and a rigid adherence to customary laws. Contrastingly, Qalang (taxed) Pashtuns are settled, pay 
taxes (qalang), and represent a hierarchal society having centralised political authority, a complex 
and prosperous economic life, and an impersonal legal system.77 Although Ahmed finds that the 
Mohmand are Nang Pashtuns,78 the Mohmand in the fieldwork location do not precisely fit either 
Nang or Qalang typologies, having features of each. For example, the Mohmand in the fieldwork 
location are ostensibly untaxed, although exhibit a more centralised authority alongside customary 
laws.  
 
74 Merck, The Mohmands, 17, quoted in ibid., 21. 
75 According to field research and interlocutors. 
76 Mansfield, ‘All Bets are Off!’ 22. 
77 For discussion of the Nang vs. Qalang concept see, Ahmed, Pakhtun Economy and Society.  
78 Ibid., Kindle Location 1231 of 8150. 
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Comparatively, the Shinwari, and in particular the Sangu Khel in the Nazian fieldwork 
location, closely match the Nang typology. While the Shinwari are organised on a segmentary basis 
with allegiance according to multiple and dynamic relationships, and leadership manifesting as 
elders (Khans) whom are primus inter pares, a permanent tribal elite has emerged in the 
Mohmand.79 Both tribes have largely hereditary Maliks, whom are influential at the 
village/community (a group of villages) level.80 Non-hereditary Malik incidence and influence has 
gradually increased in recent years, owing largely to distortions created by international 
aid/development projects, and pressure from insurgents.81  
Scott describes groups such as these as inhabiting ‘non-state space’ and as ‘self-governing 
peoples’,82 conflicting with conceptualities of ‘failed and failing’ states, ‘ungoverned’ and ‘safe 
havens’ so influential in US policy and doctrine. The Afghan state has limited, but is not devoid of, 
influence over individual and group behaviour in these areas.83 Jirgas remain central cultural 
institutions in maintaining and regulating identity and behaviour at the village level, at a (larger) 
‘meso level’ (accessed depending on the issue), and at the ‘macro level’ (the main tribal jirga). 
Each of these jirgas is relevant to the fieldwork locations.84 Our research findings concur with that 
complex interplay of governance institutions and processes at multiple levels in Nangarhar 
province. As Mansfield states, ‘the interests of local elites and rural populations … tie …. outlying 
districts of rural Afghanistan to elite groups in both Jalalabad and Kabul’ and a ‘complex web of 
interrelationships and bargaining processes between provincial and local elites and the rural 
population is highly contextualised, a function of the history, political economy and specific space 
 
79 Akbar S. Ahmed, Social and Economic Change in the Tribal Areas (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
1977), 14; Benjamin D. Hopkins and Magnus Marsden, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier (London: Hurst, 
2012). 
80 Thomas H. Johnson and Chris M. Mason, ‘No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-
Afghanistan Frontier,’ International Security 32:4 (2008): 41-77, 61.  
81 Multiple sources: fieldworkers, tribes via interlocutors, local academics and officials. 
82 James Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009).  
83 Hopkins and Marsden, Fragments of the Afghan Frontier, 216. 
84 According to a dedicated social study, and focused investigations including researchers, academics and 
local, national and international officials. 
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and territory.’85 Also, as Ruttig states ‘…it is not too late to strengthen the internal cohesion of 
certain tribes and their particular institutions by supporting their ability to re-establish functioning, 
legitimate decision-making bodies (jirgas, shuras) that can allow other political forces than the 
Taliban to play a stronger role again.’86 Extant drone analysis pays little, or, more frequently, no 
attention to these governance institutions and processes in context. Our results suggest that, in 
eastern Nangarhar at least, those effects are crucial to fully and accurately analysing and assessing 
drone effects. 
 
2.3 Analysing fieldwork results 
We employ a modified version of Boyle’s four ‘off-setting effects’ to analyse interview 
results, informed by the importance of local context and cognisant of problematic assumptions 
about ‘failed states’, ‘ungoverned’ areas and ‘safe havens’. The first ‘offsetting effect’ is ‘popular 
backlash’: ‘the application of sudden, lethal force’ in counterterrorism can ‘inflame local opinion 
against the local government’ making gaining its support more difficult, undermining 
counterinsurgency. This includes transgression of Afghan cultural norms about the sanctity of the 
home and insensitivity and disrespect to local traditions, as well as civilian casualties. Such 
backlash risks serious political fallout.87 
The second is ‘countermobilization of enemy networks’. Public outrage from Special Forces 
raids and drone strikes is an important issue. Although there is limited evidence of recruitment into 
militant networks in reaction to such raids and strikes,88 other potential effects include the 
accelerated radicalisation of existing political groups, and encouraging them to make common 
 
85 Mansfield, ‘All Bets are Off!’ 20-21. 
86 Thomas Ruttig, ‘How Tribal are the Taliban’ in Under the Drones, ed. Bashir and Crews, 102-135,134. 
87 Boyle, ‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ 344-46. 
88 E.g. Shah, ‘Do U.S. Strikes Cause Blowback?’ 
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cause with jihadi groups. Indirect costs include the loss of intelligence from dead operatives and 
losing the moral high ground from civilian casualties.89 
The third is ‘legitimacy gap’.  Boyle states ‘both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism … 
depend on political capital’, however, the former should ‘build the political capital of the local 
government’ while the latter ‘requires the government to use its political capital in authorizing 
costly or unpopular missions.’ Therefore, if this produces a government with a legitimacy gap, it 
‘will have diminished political capital and face higher costs for complying with counterterrorism 
demands.’90 Boyle claims the Karzai government had a legitimacy gap, particularly after the 
problematic 2009 presidential elections and through allegations of ‘mismanagement, incompetence 
and corruption’.  In 2014-15, the Ghani government and National Unity Government arguably had a 
weaker electoral mandate.  However, although Karzai was rather uncooperative with the US from 
circa. 2008, President Ghani has been cooperative on counterterrorism, lending credence to Taliban 
and Al Qaeda narratives it is illegitimate and a puppet regime, as Boyle warns.91 
The fourth is ‘leverage’, pertaining to that a ‘foreign backer has over its partner 
government’.92 Counterterrorism cooperation depends on leverage for partner governments to 
authorise costly counterterrorism operations. In the case of Afghanistan in the fieldwork period this 
is less of a concern as the Afghan-US Bilateral Security Agreement provides considerable latitude 
for the US to mount unilateral operations.93 However, the ‘exploitation’ of US (and NATO) 
commitment to Afghanistan, Boyle notes, remains an issue,94 and the US still requires Afghan 
cooperation for intelligence and support for effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.   
 
 
89 Boyle, ‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ 346-50. 
90 Ibid. 350. 
91 Ibid. 351. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Kate Clark and Thomas Ruttig, ‘Three Birds with One Stone: Signing the BSA and NATO SOFA to 
Project Reliability,’ Afghan Analysts Network, 6 October, 2014. 
94 Boyle, ‘Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?’ 352. 
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3. Fieldwork Analysis 
Turning to our specific fieldwork findings, the depth of insights into ‘offsetting effects’ 
through contextualisation becomes apparent. Understanding the situation in locations in eastern 
Nangarhar more fully enables far greater appreciation of the effects of drone use. 
 
3.1 Witnessing drone strikes  
All 37 respondents had seen drones, 18 reported daily drone presence in the recent past. 10 
reports noted multiple simultaneous drone presence, consistent with USAF, JSOC, and CIA 
practices, especially in the period immediately prior to strikes when multiple drones are often used 
for intelligence gathering. Many respondents were aware that some drones, including those 
involved in strikes, fly too high to be seen or heard, adding to their fear of sudden strikes. 25 
interviewees reported directly witnessing strikes (one reported surviving a strike) or attending strike 
sites within approximately one hour. Interviewees described directly experienced drone strikes and 
reports from relatives or social contacts, which were distinguished. Both types of experience 
stretched back to early 2014, totalling 68 strike descriptions. These were crosschecked against 
TBIJ’s database to help identify multiple reports of the same strike, and, potentially to fix strike 
dates and locations as closely as possible. Given very low literacy levels in these locations, 
respondents were rarely clear about dates, although they frequently identified the part of the day 
when attacks occurred, reflecting the importance of daily rhythm to pastoral and agricultural 
activities integral to life in eastern Nangarhar. Resultantly, one strike description could be 
confidently identified, with nine more significantly correlating with TBIJ-listed strikes. Some 
reports were clearly of the same strike, but descriptions are insufficiently specific to definitively 
establish the scale of overlap. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest interviewees described 
approximately 60 separate strikes.  
Respondents offered detailed descriptions of the aftermath of attacks, particularly against 
vehicles, which accounted for 41 strike descriptions. 14 interviewees (seven Lal Pur, seven Nazian) 
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described burnt corpses, the challenge of identifying, collecting, and sorting body parts into piles or 
bags. The effect of munitions centred on the burning of bodies with associated emphasis upon the 
‘flaming’ quality of drone-launched missiles. In Islam burning bodies is considered haram 
(forbidden/proscribed),95 reinforcing respondents’ negative assessments of the US role in 
Afghanistan as an occupier manipulating a weak government as part of a wider anti-Muslim 
agenda. Drone strikes amplified accusations and narratives of US reluctance to face/communicate 
with locals, juxtaposed by a willingness to kill at a distance and desecrate bodies.  
Amongst many descriptions, the following are illustrative. Interviewee 44 described one 
strike in May 2015:  
I saw a drone attacking a Toyota car (…) I heard a blast (…) when I looked up (…) 
there was dust all over the place and (…) I noticed smoke rising from the attacked car 
(…) the car was burning (...). We have a rule among us that we don’t get near the 
accident right after it happened because we are scared of being attacked by drone. After 
(…) a while people started walking towards the accident point. I also got there and I 
saw (…) its passengers were (…) thrown far away from the car and (…) turned black 
(…) their faces were not recognizable. There was (…) fear in people’s eyes and 
everyone was looking [in] the air (…) afraid of drone’s comeback and (…) bombarding. 
It was such a scary sight that I have never seen before in my life. I almost [vomited] and 
was stunned watching people burning in fire. (…) I had a headache for three days. 
Interviewee 62 described strike effects similarly: ‘It was 2 o’clock in the afternoon (…). After one 
hour people came out of their houses (…). Horror seemed in everyone’s face. When I saw the dead 
bodies [of those] were killed cruelly I [was] fed up with life. (…) They had been burnt so badly 
their faces couldn’t be recognised. Everyone hates drones.’  
Interviewee 96 observed:  
It was around 9pm and (…) we heard a sudden sound of a blast, its sound shook whole 
village. We said ‘Allah who has been attacked now?’ (T)here was complete silence in 
the village, nobody was talking. (…) An hour passed (…) dust and malodour 
[dissipated]. (…) We heard someone say ‘Hey! Village people I am injured come and 
help me.’ Nobody dared go near the injured person (…) if we went then [a] drone 
[might] attack us as well. (…) He shouted till the morning but no one went to help him. 
People went [closer] in the morning and saw a person half burned [and] dead [who] was 
the person who shouted for help. It seemed like there were a few more [in the car] but 
 
95 For indication of the sensitivity, see Jessica Donati, ‘Last Western Prisoner Leaves Afghanistan After 
Pardon,’ Wall Street Journal, 8 August, 2016.  
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they were chopped in pieces (…). [It] was burned and people were also [blackened] like 
ashes. 
These testimonies indicate instances of ‘popular backlash’ via drone strikes’ culturally and 
religiously condemned effects, even in circumstances where respondents supported strikes against 
the ‘right’ people. 
 
3.2 Living with drones, insurgents, and terrorists 
Alongside specific strike details, transcripts reveal populations experiencing immense 
stresses, reflecting fear of strikes, and disruption to already marginal subsistence livelihoods based 
on agriculture and limited trade. Significantly, no respondents expressed support for insurgent 
groups’ political projects; most rejected them, and all reported experiencing disruption caused by 
insurgent and terrorist presence and drone operations. ‘Popular backlash’ was evident in twenty-
three interviewees (twelve Lal Pur, eleven Nazian) identifying the Afghan government as powerless 
or bypassed in drone strike decision-making, consequently alienating interviewees. Contra Shah’s 
narrow use of ‘backlash’ as only relating to joining militant organisations,96 Boyle’s framing 
supports richer analysis through contextualising different forms of popular response to drone use 
and strikes. Interviews also reveal weakened customary governance institutions and dislocation of 
people underscoring alienation and resentment. Two interviewees in Lal Pur are typical. 
Interviewee 14 explained: 
The biggest influence it had on our people is they (inhabitants) started leaving the 
village and now we don’t have even 50 homes nearby in the village. Another (…) effect 
(…) is they cannot do their work in the field because Taliban walk around the village 
and fields (…) and no one can tell Taliban to leave this place because we are afraid (…) 
and [there is] fear that a plane [or drone] will attack any time so they are very frightened 
(…). Before, people were busy in the mountains collecting wood, transferring it in the 
market through animals and they would sell it (…). But now Taliban from one side and 
non-Muslims from the other side have forced people to sit at home even if they are 
dying of hunger. 
 
96 Shah, ‘Do US Strikes Cause Blowback?’ 
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Interviewee 6 reinforces the account of displacement: ‘Most of the people in (region within 
Lal Pur) left their homes and went to other areas since their lives and personal assets were in 
danger. Most of them shifted to (redacted) and (redacted) districts where they are facing a lot of 
problems… because they have their animals with them, but they don’t have their own fields in those 
places to feed their animals (…).’ 
Interviewee 96, from Nazian, described similar outcomes there: ‘We have many problem[s] 
with drone[s], we have agricultural lands and (…) animals (...). (I)n [the] past we had worked in our 
land and take animals to mountain but when these drones start (…) bombing in our village (…) we 
can’t go to our lands, we can't take our animals to mountain so no one go outside of village and 
home because everyone scare that the drone will shoot (…). Most of our youths going to foreign 
countries.’ Three interviewees discussed the customary practice of carrying a firearm, and 
emphasised how fear of being misidentified as Taliban and targeted by drones had stopped 
economic activity such as herding animals in mountains occupied by predators, or tending 
particularly remote fields.  
Respondents were fully aware of the presence of, and distinctions between, (Afghan) Taliban 
and other groups, such as Tehrek-i-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-I-Islam, foreign fighters and 
(particularly amongst respondents interviewed later in the research period) ISIL-K. Interviewees 
routinely encountered members of these groups as they moved through the locale, with some 
respondents noting the intermingling of local populations and insurgent membership, or in one case 
describing personal friendships with Taliban. Illustrative accounts indicate local people’s awareness 
of different groups’ presence, and how counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities, including 
drones, affected those groups and their relationships to locals. Interviewee 26 in Lal Pur stated: 
Taliban (…) are scared of drones and are afraid of being shot by them. (…) The other 
effect (…) the drones have had on Taliban is that they never let the people from other 
groups (…) enter the areas which are under their control because whenever the number 
of Taliban increases in an area, (…) [it] gets targeted by drones. Our area (…) is under 
the occupation of Tehrek-i Taliban. Some time ago, there was a conflict among them 
and Islamic Emirate [Afghan Taliban], because the (…) Tehrek-i Taliban asked them 
[Afghan Taliban] to [go to] the other area because we want to attack Pakistan from here 
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and your existence in this area makes it difficult for us to live here since [drones would 
attack us]. 
In Nazian, where descriptions of ISIL-K presence concentrated, interviewee 9 highlighted 
ISIL-K extremism, and also the fear inspired by drones: ‘Daesh [ISIL-K] have created such 
atrocities that we should thank drones. Drones are there to prevent them and Daesh are [only] afraid 
of them. Because those wild and ruthless people are not even afraid of God.’  
Thirteen interviewees (five Lal Pur, eight Nazian) noted drones’ effectiveness at disrupting 
Taliban and other groups’ operations by inducing fear. However, this reinforced pressures from 
insurgent/terrorist groups on local families. Locals in both fieldwork locations were strongly 
expected to provide hospitality, including tea, food, and accommodation (such as in the male guest 
house or hufra), according with deeply-help principles of melmastia (hospitality) in Paktunwali.97 
Interviewee 96 summarises several respondents’ views: ‘There are lots of Taliban here who pass 
our house or sometimes (…) rest in front of our house or ask us to bring tea or food.  At these 
moments our family members (…) fear (…) if drone see them and bombard them then we will die 
as well.’  
Detailed incidences of strong pressure or coercion from the ‘visitors’ were provided. For 
example, families with a member working for the Afghan government or military were warned not 
to welcome them home, or have any contact with them.98 Interviewee 40, a Malik, commented: 
‘There is (…) worry in our area, if people join army then (…) when they come to village (…) they 
have even faced danger of being killed by Taliban.’ Three interviewees (two Lal Pur, one Nazian) 
described local religious leaders refusing to offer funeral prayers for ANDSF personnel from their 
area, fearing insurgents’ retribution or because of their co-option by insurgents. Duress included 
threats of accusations of spying for the US or collaborating with the Afghan government, typically 
 
97 Hufra relates to one of main prestige conferring symbols of tribal society (the others being the jirga 
(council) and the topak (gun)). Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society, Kindle Locations 297, 5986. 
98 Mohmand and Shinwari are ‘border tribes’. Both Afghan authorities and foreign supporters have found it 
hard to recruit them. Antonio Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile 
Institution (London: Hurst, 2015), 54, 57. In these areas nationalist feelings run high because of suffering 
perceived to originate from Pakistan. A high degree of cohesion, ability to self-rule and self-govern exists. 
Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, 62-63. 
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punishable by death, if shelter and hospitality were not provided. Another Malik, interviewee 70, 
explained: ‘The Taliban are coming (…) to our homes, we are not inviting them (…), they are 
coming by (…) force (…), and the people have to provide them some food and other things and also 
sit with them and behave properly, and whenever you sit with them inside your home, you are 
always afraid that we might come under the target of the drones, and if we don’t sit with the Taliban 
(…) they would (…) most probably say that you are American’s spy or agent and that is why we 
would not let you live.’ 
Interviewee 26 described a similar experience: ‘Whenever someone from Taliban is being shot 
by (…) drones (…) they ask us to take their partners to hospitals, or, if they are dead (…) to (…) 
bring their (…) bodies to them and if we don’t then they (…) blame us of being spies for (…) 
foreigners.’  
Ten interviews (four Lal Pur, six Nazian) describe eroding community relations and trust 
because of concern at accusations of spying or informing related to drone use. Customary sources of 
Pashtun honour (nang)99 – and the honour of the respective hosts, communities and (sub-) tribes – 
were resultantly heavily impacted by insurgents’ and terrorists’ behaviours following drone strikes 
(and the lack of protection from the Afghan government or US/NATO-led forces). Specific 
examples include demanding melmastia in a threatening manner; allegations against hosts; and, 
invading sensitive areas of the home, such as the hufra, without invitation; and, the threat of 
entering areas where women were present. In turn this impacted the maintenance of relations and 
ethnic boundaries, with ramifications for authority and order in the area, the group, and its 
governance.100  
Following drone strikes, insurgents and terrorists interrogate locals, frequently involving 
allegations of enabling drone strikes by providing information or physically marking people, 
 
99 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 120. Barth refers to izzat (honour), congruent with nang (honour). 
See also Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society, Kindle Location 3536.  
100 Barth, ‘Pathan Identity’, 119-23. 
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vehicles, or structures. Interviewee 74 explained:  ‘Before, it was (…) said (…) drones hit their 
targets according to (…) SIM cards and they cannot hit any target without those (...). People were 
saying that the spies put some sorts of chips in the pockets of Taliban and then they are (…) 
targeted by drones. Therefore, Taliban killed several people whom they thought were doing this.’  
Interviewee 9 was blunt: ‘(I)f suddenly a blast happen[s], Taliban and Daesh will behead us in 
accusation of reporting and spying on them.’  
 
3.3 Weakened governance 
These incidences and dynamics directly impact locals’ ability to ‘do Pashtu’101 such as: 
honouring invitations from other communities; providing hospitality to one another and other 
communities; offering and attending marriages, funerals, and celebrations; engaging in farming and 
fishing practices when drones are very active; meeting to organise and discuss these matters with 
other locals; and, calling, attending and participating in jirgas.102 A number of (sub-) tribal Khans 
(elders/chiefs) from both tribes and sub-tribes had moved out of the area, several of which need to 
be met with in order to maintain relations, cultural boundaries and behaviours, and engage in on-
going customary regulation and governance of the community via jirgas. Maliks from both sub-
tribes also reported being prevented from convening or taking part in jirgas as a result of drone 
activities. 
Every interviewee described disruptions from drones damaging customary governance, 
consequently weakening customary relations, cultural boundaries, behaviour, community cohesion 
and security.103 This caused further stresses on daily existence. Particularly impacted were honour 
(nang) with regard to protecting women and children, including their psychological well-being;104 
 
101 Ibid., 119. 
102 Based on Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society, and fieldwork findings.  
103 Barth, ‘Pathan Identity’ 
104 Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society; Miakhel ‘The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in 




the ability for elders to obtain, deliver and distribute moral and material goods; and, to fulfil, 
maintain and regulate customary roles, influence and governance.  
Important social occasions for ‘doing Pashtu’, e.g. weddings and funerals, were smaller than 
hitherto due to drones. Attendees reportedly arrived as late as possible within the bounds of social 
acceptability, and left early, especially before nightfall. They feared large gatherings might be 
mistaken for insurgent/terrorist group gatherings and attacked by drones. The size of gatherings was 
also affected by expressed distrust of those outside the area or unknown to locals who might be 
members of groups likely to attract drone strikes.  
Interviewee 36, highlighted damage to the social fabric of communities, reflecting many 
comments across the sample: ‘(B)efore we used to gather a lot but now we try to avoid gatherings. 
We try to avoid going to each other’s homes (…). More importantly, we try to avoid making 
relations with newcomers or strangers, because it’s hard to trust everyone. We cannot recognise the 
person whether he is a terrorist or a good person or if he is a target of drones or not.’ 
Nineteen interviewees (eleven Lal Pur, eight Nazian), described Maliks’ marginalisation 
regarding drones. Elders were described as: refusing to discuss the issue of drones; co-opted or 
coerced by the Taliban; unable or disinclined to take up the issue with provincial or national 
officials, or through customary means; and, less able to resolve matters because of decisions made 
by foreigners. A Malik, interviewee 70, noted in frustration the impact on usually influential 
customary governance figures and institutions: ‘(T)he political elders do have some kind of 
symbolic role, they do not have any power [in the circumstances now], I do not think that our views 
(…) matter [to those] who take decision[s].’ 
This marginalisation matters because Malik’s standing amongst the population depends heavily 
on their ability to influence other authorities and to secure funding, projects and support for their 
community. Although Maliks can have vested interests in being seen to support practices considered 
de facto permitted/endorsed by national and provincial governmental authorities, including security 
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institutions, pressure also exists in both fieldwork areas for Maliks to be appointed who are pliant to 
particular interests and overlapping constituencies,105 exacerbating their vulnerability resulting from 
marginalisation.  
Of fourteen (six Lal Pur, eight Nazian) accounts of discussions of drone strikes with religious 
leaders, a substantial majority report Mullahs condemning drones and the US. Reasons include 
indiscriminate attacks, the non-Muslim faith of the US and the necessity for Muslim solidarity 
against foreign intervention in Afghanistan. Indeed, fifteen (eight Lal Pur, seven Nazian) 
respondents asserted narratives of a continuing war against Muslims via drones. Resultantly, Khans’ 
and Maliks’ ability to refute religious figures calling for Jihad and extreme actions in response to 
drones has been seriously undermined. This is consistent with Ahmed’s observation regarding 
(Mohmand) Maliks: ‘the weight of their word depend[s] to a great extent on their personal 
influence’. Maliks’ lack of a relationship with drones and those using them is not lost on the local 
populace. Consequently, Maliks’ influence in moderating behaviours and balancing religious 
figures in the area has been impacted,106 weakening customary governance. Whilst Boyle’s 
‘legitimacy gap’ emphasises the national level, interviews reveal a comparable problem in the 
fieldwork locations resulting from drone use. Customary governance practices in Nazian and Lal 
Pur militate against radical and extremist jihadist political groups, but are being seriously weakened 
including by drones. This works against both the US’s overarching policy goal regarding ‘failed or 
failing states’ and related conceptualities, its counterinsurgency goal, and causes undesirable effects 
in relation to its counterterrorism goal in strategically crucial locations.  
 
 
105 Per discussions with interlocutors familiar with fieldwork locations. This is largely consistent with 
Antonio Giustozzi, ‘If Only There Were Leaders: The Problem of “Fixing” the Pashtun Tribes,’ in 
Rethinking the Swat Pathan, ed. Magnus Marsden and Benjamin D. Hopkins (London: Hurst, 2012), 239-47.  
106 Ahmed, Pakhtun Economy and Society, Kindle Location 1411, also confirmed by interlocutors. 
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3.4 Further alienation from government and international actors 
Twenty-three interviewees (twelve Lal Pur, eleven Nazian) identified the Afghan government 
as powerless or bypassed in drone strike decision-making, speaking to Boyle’s ‘popular backlash’, 
‘legitimacy gap’ (such as vulnerability to narratives of illegitimate government and governance), 
and ‘leverage’ (e.g. potential cooperation for costly operations/strikes including intelligence).  
Research beyond the fieldwork locations revealed further alienation and problems indicative of 
these ‘offsetting effects’ and of ‘counter-mobilisation’, too. A wide range of interlocutors describe 
multiple discussions of drone activities at Nangarhar Provincial Council (PC), including proximate 
to the fieldwork period. In 2014, it closed its doors to the central government protesting at inaction 
about drone use in the province. PC members include influential tribal figures, such as a close 
relative of the head of the Mohmand tribe in Afghanistan, and others with interests in the fieldwork 
locations. The Provincial Governor has raised effects and implications of drone activity multiple 
times with Afghan and international military officials at local and national level since 2014. MPs 
for parts of the province (including those tribally linked), and the tribal leadership of the Mohmand 
and Shinwari, have raised concerns in Parliament. Indeed, detailed conversations about drone 
activity occurred with civilian and military officials in Kabul at the very highest levels. Similarly, 
jirgas at the meso and macro levels have discussed drone use; the extent and gravity of concerns 
mean issues have been considered at the main tribal jirgas. The perceived (and actual) inability of 
the main tribal jirgas to obtain much information about drone activities has created great frustration.  
The lack of perceived results on the issue of drones, and most pressingly drone strikes, has 
significantly impacted perceptions of the nang of figures, about which particular concern was 
expressed among interviewees and other interlocutors. This further indicates a ‘legitimacy gap’, and 
ramifications for ‘leverage’, particularly intelligence and wider cooperation.  
Widely held and intensifying resentment of the Afghan government, and especially the US, 
results from the perception the US was ‘the cause’ of impacts from drones. Interviewee 33, from 
Lal Pur, asserted: 
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Drone attacks are for the benefit of NATO, ISAF and American forces (…). I do think 
the Americans and NATO couldn’t face Taliban face-to-face in the war and the Taliban 
defeated them, and now to have some kind of result (…), they are carrying out those 
attacks (…) a good and clear path for them, because their soldiers are not getting killed 
by these attacks (…). (T)heir target is to hit 5 or 10 insurgents but they are putting 
millions of people under deep stress (…). The benefit goes to the government, but it is a 
big loss for us, the drone attacks can have temporary effects but the Taliban are not less, 
their manpower is not less, so these attacks are putting negative effects on the people. 
Illustratively, fifteen interviewees (eight Lal Pur, seven Nazian) highlighted the non-Muslim 
faith of the US and/or NATO states as a reason for their lack of care for Afghans, and contributing 
to interviewees’ antipathy. Others stressed civilian casualties from drone strikes, an important 
element of ‘popular backlash’. Resulting alienation and resentment clearly impacted trust in the 
government and US/NATO-led forces, undermining current and prospective support essential for 
counterinsurgency, and impacting cooperation and intelligence provision for counterterrorism, and 
thus ‘leverage’. 
Fieldwork researcher debriefings revealed younger respondents (30 and under) demonstrated 
especial angst about drones. Several expressed the desire to travel to Jalalabad, Nangahar’s capital, 
where they believed the drones were operating from the US base, ‘to try to put a stop to them’. 
Numerous elders and parents stated since drone strikes had begun youth were more open to radical 
and extreme views. They noted community means of managing these views had been circumscribed 
by drone activity restricting gatherings. Whilst it is unclear if drone use is accelerating extremism 
among existing insurgent/terrorist groups, indications exist; for example, pressure placed on local 
populations around spying or informing on insurgents. Regarding ‘counter-mobilization’, the 
aforementioned incidents involving youths, interviewees’ expressions of religious solidarity through 
concern about non-Muslims killing Muslims, anger at civilian casualties, and weakening informal 
governance constraints on behaviour are cause for serious concern.  
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US drone use in these remote regions has clearly alienated populations with historical loyalties 
to Kabul. Prospects for fulfilling policy goals are challenged by counter-productive and ‘offsetting’ 
effects resulting from drone use. Goals of shaping the environment, supporting development of 
‘legitimate government’, and both actions and cooperation against insurgents and terrorist groups 
are seriously impacted by drone use, with longer-term implications. These outweigh short-term 
benefits drone use and strikes bring. Provincial government influence, even in the capital Jalalabad, 
and its extension into remote regions is important yet delicate,107 which drone use in the fieldwork 
locations and elsewhere has impacted. The Mohmand and Shinwari tribes and their sub-tribes in the 
fieldwork locations are important examples of actors, institutions, and related processes profoundly 
misunderstood by conceptualities of ‘failed states’, ‘ungoverned’ areas and ‘[terrorist] safe-havens’ 
directly informing US policy, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency doctrine, and efforts.    
We identified three broad claims supportive of drone strikes to be indirectly tested through 
fieldwork: (i) done properly, targeted killings can strengthen support for the host government, 
which is key to defeating an insurgency; (ii) drones may reduce tensions between peacebuilding 
activities and waging war; and, (iii) drone strikes (and use) do more good than harm. In fieldwork 
locations in eastern Nangarhar none of these is borne out.  Any support gained by killing the ‘right’ 
people via drones, such as insurgents/terrorists, is undermined through fear, serious social and 
economic disruption, and deleterious effects on local communities and governance institutions with 
short and longer-term ramifications for counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and peacebuilding. In 
addition to drones, national and international efforts/support against insurgents and terrorists is 
highly limited providing a useful ‘test’ of drone use. On this evidence, and considered in 
appropriate context, drone use and strikes have been doing more harm than good.  
 
 




We set out to demonstrate how drone analysis suffers through a lack of appropriate 
contextualisation, why it needs to change, and what can be achieved through appropriately 
contextualised analysis.  
Section 1 showed a two-fold lack of contextualisation with leading, mostly statistical, 
academic studies of drone effectiveness overlooking crucial context including employing different 
definitions, data, and highly questionable composite designations regarding groups and areas. Their 
lack of differentiation between insurgencies and terrorism exacerbated the lack of context. 
Qualitative studies, whilst more attuned to context, seldom consider its wider and deeper 
importance to analysing and assessing targeted killing/decapitation/drone effectiveness or its 
relationship with policy goals and doctrine. However, they have raised important concerns about 
context and the pursuit of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the same area. Secondly, we 
showed how US policy and doctrine also display deep-seated difficulties with problematic 
conceptualisations of ‘failed and failing states’, ‘ungoverned areas’ and ‘[terrorist] safe havens’ that 
are not context-appropriate. This reinforces Boyle’s arguments that pursuit of counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgency together can be at cross-purposes, and also by locating divergent doctrinal policy 
goals. Precluding appropriate appreciation of customary governance via erroneous policy and 
consequent doctrinal assumptions is particularly damaging. 
Sections 2 and 3 established why a more contextualised research design offers valuable 
insights into drone effects, and what those are in fieldwork locations in eastern Nangarhar. 
Enquiring into the conditions in locations where drone use occurs, rather than deriving hypotheses 
from abstract behavioural models, produces a responsive research design that learns from and 
adjusts to the context it is applied to. Detailing the distinctive context of the two study areas reveals 
how customary governance rooted in historically evolved practices is dynamically inter-woven with 
Afghanistan’s central government institutions and practices. This both undermines the 
claims/assumptions of a ‘failed state’, ‘ungoverned’ and ‘[terrorist] safe-haven’, and reveals how 
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drone use/strikes in these areas are especially damaging to these governance institutions. Boyle’s 
offsetting effects proved a useful heuristic for enquiring into effects, with appropriate adjustments, 
for example, ‘legitimacy gap’ is applicable to local and not only central/national governmental 
institutions. Similarly, ‘popular backlash’ encompasses wider concerns with governance institutions 
and ‘leverage’ can see acute focus on the need for host government support, local intelligence, and 
cooperation despite US unilateral strike capability.  
Without appropriate context, these insights are unavailable to analysis and assessment of 
drone use or for improving drone use. Boyle’s argument about the challenges of simultaneously 
pursuing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is borne out, but with new insights helping 
identify specific consequences in the fieldwork areas and elsewhere in Afghanistan.  Measuring 
intervention effectiveness by, for example, ‘disrupted’ or ‘degraded’ terrorist organisations, whilst 
overlooking implications for local and national security, governance, capacity building and 
statebuilding, badly skews measures of success or effectiveness, rendering them not only highly 
questionable but also counter-productive.  
